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Consequences of the Met-Italy Accord for the
International Restitution of Cultural Property
Aaron Kyle Briggs*

In February 2006, the Metropolitan Museum of Art ("Met") and the Italian
Ministry of Culture signed the Italy-Met Euphronios Accord ("Accord"), forever
changing the dynamics of the international cultural property trade.' Although the
Met purchased the Euphronios Krater ("Krater") in 1972 for $1.2 million, Met
Director Phillippe de Montebello agreed to relinquish ownership of the piece to
Italy, where the object was originally found, in exchange for long-term loans of
works of equal value and an absolution of liability for the illegal excavation and
export of the Krater. 2 This unprecedented resolution to a decades-old
international property dispute has the potential to foster a new spirit of
cooperation between museums and source nations, spawn stricter museum
acquisition and loan policies, reduce the demand for illicit cultural property, and
permanently alter the balance of power in the international cultural property
debate.
Since the Accord was signed in February of 2006, change has already
begun with the issuance of new museum guidelines3 and increased awareness of
the problem in countries with large collections of cultural property, specifically
Egypt, Peru, and Italy.4 However, is the Accord a replicable model whereby
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Association of Art Museum Directors, Report of the AAMD Subcommittee on Incoming Loans of
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See, for example, David Bonetti, Who Owns the Past?, St Louis Post-Dispatch B1 (Feb 26, 2006)
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Arthfacts: Clashes between Museums, Nations More Frequent, Chi Trib C3 (Mar 5, 2006) (Discussing
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other nations and museums can amicably resolve disputes without litigation? If
not, is it still capable of generating change in the art world? This Comment will
demonstrate that given the circumstances of the Accord, the model is unlikely to
be perfectly replicated by other nations and museums. Nevertheless, it still has
the potential to significantly alter the way in which cultural property disputes are
resolved.
This Comment will proceed in four parts. The first section will provide a
contextual overview of the international art market, the cultural property debate,
and the culture of acquisition to show what is at stake and why these issues are
important. The second section will examine the legal framework, including the
current international conventions, and the US cultural property regime. This
section will also expound upon the legal issues surrounding claims by source
nations for restitution from American institutions. The third section will detail
the Italian cultural property regime, the circumstances surrounding the Krater,
and the Accord, which form a basis for the Italian Model ("Model"). The fourth
section will assess whether the Model is replicable, and separately, its potential
impact on the international art market. The final section will conclude by
suggesting that the Model may initiate and form the basis of a dialogue between
museums and source nations.
I. THE CONTEXT

Cultural property, as defined by the UNESCO' Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property ("UNESCO Convention"), is "property which,
on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being
of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science" and
fits within certain categories. 6 While the term "cultural property" includes a wide
purview of objects, the focus of this Comment will be on the international trade
in antiquities, or objects of significant cultural importance more than one
hundred years old.
A. THE ANTIQUITIES TRADE
The global trade in antiquities represents a small portion of the entire art
market with sales between one-hundred million and two-hundred million dollars
5
6

UNESCO refers to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Nov 14, 1970), art 1, 823 UN Treaty Ser 231 (1972).
Relevant Article 1 categories for this Comment include: (c) products of archaeological excavations
or discoveries, (d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological dismembered
sites (0 objects of ethnological interest (g) property of artistic interest.
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annually. It is important to distinguish between the licit and illicit trades. In the
licit trade, generally, the objects are discovered in archaeologically rich nations
such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey through official excavations of ancient sites.
Then either prior to the enactment of a national ownership law or afterwards,
with the state's consent (usually via an export certificate), they are sold through
public auction houses like Sotheby's and Christie's or private dealers. The
antiquities finally end up in the care of museums or private collectors in market
nations such as the US, the UK, and other Northern European nations,' with
possible intermediary exchanges through other dealers.
There are two means by which the licit trade in antiquities becomes illicit.
First, objects are stolen from places where they are documented. Second, and
the focus of this Comment, objects are unofficially excavated from ancient sites
and then sold to middlemen within the country in violation of the national
cultural property ownership laws. From there, the objects are sold to dealers in
market nations in violation of the national export laws, whereupon the
provenances of the objects are forged and/or title is perfected through the
operation of favorable statutes of limitations.9 The objects are then sold to
museums or private collectors.
Some estimate that the illicit trade in antiquities represents billions of
dollars annually, rendering antiquities the third largest global black market) °
However, according to Interpol, the actual figure is unascertainable because of
the lack of meaningful statistics and the underground nature of the trade. 1
Though quantifying the illicit trade is nearly impossible, this is immaterial
because the significance of the looting crisis lies in the destruction of cultural
heritage, not numbers. The illicit cultural property market necessarily involves
the impromptu or unofficial excavation of sites without the proper analysis, care,
and preservation taken in official excavations, thus resulting in objects of
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Arielle Kozloff, The Antiquities Market: When, What, Where, Who, Why... and How Much?, in Kate
Fitz Gibbon, ed, Who Owns the Past?:"CulturalPolig, CulturalPropery, and the Law 183, 187 (Rutgers
2005).
Id at 184.
Sue J. Park, The CulturalProperty Regime in Ital:An IndustrialiZedSource Nation's Difficulties in Retaining
and Recovering its Antiquities, 23 U Pa J Intl Econ L 931, 938 (2002) (noting that "[u]nder Swiss civil
law, the owner of stolen acquisitions, who purchased in good faith, becomes their legal owner at
the end of five years. Thus, once five years pass, illegally excavated antiquities of unclear
provenance are safe to leave Switzerland for their final destination in market nations.").
See, for example, id at 936; Charles A. Palmer, Recovering Stolen Art: Avoiding the Pifalls, 82 Mich
BarJ 20, 21 (2003).

1

Interpol, Stolen Works of Art. Frequently Asked Questions, available
www.interpol.int/Pubfic/WorkOfArt/woafaq.asp> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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unknown or incomplete provenance. 12 This imperfect knowledge is devastating
because "[a]n antiquity without a provenance-even if perfectly preserved-is
of limited historical significance; if we do not know where it came from, it can
provide only limited scientific knowledge of the past."' 3 Thus, the illicit cultural
property trade is detrimental to man's understanding of his past, and must be
stopped so that archaeological excavation can occur with the requisite care and
expertise crucial to ensuring the furtherance of knowledge. 4
B. THE CULTURAL PROPERTY DEBATE
The question of how to achieve an end to the illicit cultural property trade
is much debated and necessarily implicates the larger debate between cultural
nationalists and cultural internationalists 5 over the enforcement of foreign
export controls. Generally, proponents of cultural internationalism, usually
market nations, 6 emphasize the international interest in preserving cultural
property and thus the exhibition of it throughout the world without enforcing
export controls. 7 In contrast, proponents of cultural nationalism, usually source

12

13

Provenance is defined as "[t]he full history and ownership of an item from the time of its
discovery or creation to the present day, from which authenticity and ownership is determined."
International Council of Museums, ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums (2006), available online at
<http://icom.museum/ethics.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Paul M. Bator, An Essay On the InternationalTrade in Art,34 Stan L Rev 275, 301 (1982).

14

See id.

15

For an overview of the two schools of thought regarding cultural property, see John Henry

16

17

Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About CulturalPropery, 80 Am J Intl L 831 (Oct 1986).
Market nations are those with a high public (museum) and private (collector/dealer) demand for
works of art and antiquities and typically include developed nations such as the US, the UK, and
Japan. See Bator, 34 Stan L Rev at 292 (cited in note 13).
John Henry Merryman, The Free InternationalMovement of CulturalProperly, 31 NYU J Intl L & Pol 1,
9 (Fall 1998). Cultural internationalists generally believe in the free movement of cultural property
and are more likely to favor buyers' rights as good faith purchasers over source nations' claims
that an object has been illegally exported and thus are unwilling to enforce foreign nations' export
controls. See Bator, 34 Stan L Rev at 287 (cited in note 13) (observing that "the fact that an art
object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful importation into the United
States .. .the possession of an art object cannot lawfully be disturbed in the United States solely
because it was illegally exported from another country"). Scholars often point to the preamble to
the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (1954), 249 UN Treaty Serv 240 ("[being convinced that damage to cultural property
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since
each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world") ("Hague Convention"), as the
international legal source of the doctrine.
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nations, 8 emphasize the national interest in preserving cultural heritage within
the state and the necessity of enforcing export controls to stop the illicit trade.' 9
Enmeshed within the larger question concerning recognition of foreign
export controls is the proper role of museums and their policies for acquisitions
and loans of antiquities. Museums promote the vision of the "universal
museum" in which they are the protectorates of the world's cultural property,
protecting and preserving it while simultaneously exhibiting it to the public in
their roles as educators and facilitators of appreciation for world cultures. 20 In
contrast, archaeologists advocate that art and antiquity must be excavated and
researched in situ, or in the context of where it is found, in order to learn
everything possible about the cultures that came before.2' Yet, both agree that
cultural heritage is important, must be protected, and even that scientific
excavations should be done to examine the pieces in situ.
The disagreement surfaces regarding the question of what should be done
with objects already in the care of collectors and museums that are later
determined to be illegally excavated. Museums advocate the position that the
public should not be denied the opportunity to view these culturally valuable
pieces. Furthermore, conclusive proof of legal import at the time of acquisition
is not always possible. 2 By contrast, archaeologists argue from an economic
perspective that in order to stop illegal excavation it is important to cut off the
demand. Museums should refuse to purchase artifacts of unknown
18

Source nations are typically those rich in cultural property resources and seek to retain their
cultural property through strict ownership laws. Several states claim ownership to all antiquities
discovered subsequent to the date of the legislative enactment, including Greece, Italy, and
Turkey, among others. P.J. O'Keefe, Export and Import Controls on Movement of the CulturalHeritage:
Problems at the NationalLevel, 10 SyrJ Ind L & Comm 352, 359 n 30 (1983).

19

20

21

22

See Merryman, 31 NYU IndJ L & Pol at 12 (cited in note 17). Cultural nationalists emphasize the
relationship between cultural property and the national heritage and generally favor a return of
illegally exported cultural property to source nations. Scholars point to the UNESCO Convention
where signatories oppose the illicit export and transfer of ownership of cultural property (art 2),
decree trade in cultural property in violation of the source nation's export controls is illicit (art 3),
and resolve to recognize these export controls by prohibiting the importation of these objects
(arts 7, 9, 13). See Merryman, 80 AmJ Ind L at 843 (cited in note 15).
Association of Art Museum Directors, Art Museums and the InternationalExchange of CulturalArtifacts
(2001), available online at <http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/CulturalProperty000.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007). See also The British Museum, Declaration on the Importance and
Value of UniversalMuseums, available online at <http://www.thebritishmuseum.ac.uk/newsroom/
current2003/universalmuseums.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
For a fuller discussion on the importance of responsible excavation and research in situ, see
generally Daniel Graepler and Marina Mazzei, Provenience: Unknown!: IllegalExcavationsDestroy the
ArchaeologicalHeritage,available online at <http://www.newpaltz.edu/museum/exhibitions/
provenienceunknown.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Association of Art Museum Directors, Art Museums and the InternationalExchange of CulturalArtifacts
at 1-2 (cited in note 20).
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provenance.23 In its most extreme form, museums should be denied the right to
exhibit illegally excavated works and forced to effectuate their restitution. The
argument follows that if museums know they will have to return the pieces, they
will adopt stricter acquisition policies requiring more diligent research into the
provenance of the work, and refuse to trade in anything that is even borderline
suspicious-thus the significance of the Met's voluntary restitution of the
Krater.
C. THE CULTURE OF ACQUISITION
To fully understand the Accord it is important to know what the culture of
museum acquisitions was like during the time the Krater was acquired, and also
subsequently when controversy surfaced concerning its provenance and
restitution. Acquiring antiquities became popular in the 1960s, a time when
museums were little concerned with an object's history so long as it was
valuable, and even turning a blind eye to knowledge of illicit provenance. 24 To
illustrate, just prior to acquiring the Krater in 1972, the Met purchased the
Lydian Treasure in the late 1960s. 2' This was done with knowledge that the
treasure had been looted and exported illegally out of Turkey in 1966.26 Curators
given free reign to build collections for great museums ignored evidence of
illegal excavation and export while acquisition committees blindly accepted
curators' testimonies of a piece's legitimacy. 27 Despite the advent of the
UNESCO Convention in 1970, and several museums declaring openly that they
28
would not acquire objects without documentation of legitimate provenance,
the cultural property trade has continued to thrive.29 Although there is increasing
23

See Archaeological Institute of America ("AIA"), PrinciplesforMuseum Acquisitions ofAntiquiies 2

24

(2005), available online at < http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/archaeologywatch/
museumpolicy/AIAPrinciplesMusuemAcquisition.pdf > (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole, and Peter Watson, Stealing History: The Illidt Trade in CulturalMaterial 810 (McDonald Inst 2000), available online at <http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/iarc/research/
illicittrade.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

25

Id at 10.

26

A Met curator had actually visited the site where it was looted and matched fragments to the

27

acquisition piece. Id.
Geoff Edgers, Objects of Inspection: The Italian Government and the MFA Are Nearing a Showdown over

28

Artworks Some Insist are Stolen. Which Ones? Nobody's Saying for Sure, Boston Globe N1 (Mar 19,
2006).
Museums at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard University, and the British Museum

29

made these declarations in 1970. See Brodie, Dole, and Watson, Stealing History at 8-9 (cited in
note 24).
Id. The Boston Museum of Fine Arts has stated openly that it must continue unrestricted
collecting, id, and theJ. Paul Getty Museum ("Getty") through the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s
has acquired controversial pieces. See generally Andrew L. Slayman, The Trialin Rome,
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pressure on museums to tighten acquisition and loan policies, through
organizations such as the American Association of Art Museum Dealers
("AAMD") and the International Council of Museums ("ICOM"), 30 museums
have been slow to effectuate real changes in their policies because of the lessthan-complete implementation of the UNESCO Convention in the US3 and the
difficulty for source nations to achieve restitution. The Accord is therefore
significant in its potential to usher in sweeping changes for museums acquiring
and displaying antiquities.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal regime protecting the international trade in cultural property is a
complex array of international conventions, bilateral agreements, national
ownership and export laws, and judicial interpretation. This section will lay out
the principles of the UNESCO Convention and examine how it has been
ratified and implemented in the US in order to understand the legal regime
within which source nations make restitution claims for objects in US
institutions.
A. THE UNESCO CONVENTION
The 1970 UNESCO Convention, with over one hundred signatories,3 2 is
perhaps the most important legal instrument dealing with the cultural property
trade.3 3 Adopted as a means to stop the illicit trade in art and antiquities during

30

Archaeology (Feb 6, 2006), available online at <http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/
italytrial/> (visited Jan 15, 2007) (discussing the history of Getty acquisitions).
See generally <http://www.aamd.org> (visited Jan 15, 2007); <http://www.icom.org> (visited

31

Jan 15, 2007).
This Comment deals with American museums because most of the European museums built their
collections in past centuries before national ownership laws were in place, and this is evident in
the fact that most of the 20 th and 21 st century restitution claims have been against US institutions.
See Alan Riding, Why Antiquiies Trials' Focus on America, NY Times A16 (Nov 25, 2005)
(suggesting that the British Museum, Louvre, and Pergamon, all European museums, built their
collections during the age of exploration "according to the practice at the time").

32

33

US Department of State, International Cultural Properly Protection: Oveniew, available online at
<http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/overview.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
There is another major international convention, the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects 1995, 34 ILM 1322 (1995) ("UNIDROIT Convention"), but having only twenty-two
signatories, and not including the US or any of the other major art market nations, it has had little
effect on stemming the illicit trade and is outside the scope of this Comment. The UNIDROIT
Convention calls more stringently for the restitution of illegally exported cultural property than
the UNESCO Convention. See Kate Fitz Gibbon, Chronology of CulturalPropery Legislation, in Kate
Fitz Gibbon, ed, Who Owns the Past?: CulturalPoliy, Cultural Property, and the Law 3, 6 (Rutgers
2005).
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times of peace,34 it is opposed to the illicit export of cultural property.3" The
UNESCO Convention requires its parties to prohibit the importation of stolen
cultural property from public institutions in other countries provided the
material has been inventoried and to recover and return any stolen property at
the request of the source nation in return for just compensation.36 Regarding
cultural property in jeopardy of pillage:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy
from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other
States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to this Convention
undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a concerted international
effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures,
including the control of exports and imports and international commerce in
the specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned
shall take provisional measures to the extent feasible 37to prevent irremediable
injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State.
Finally, there is a provision calling for the recognition of export controls
and return of objects for any property that a state party deems "inalienable,"
though subject to the national laws of the importing state.3" The Convention
clearly contemplates an export control regime, though only in certain
circumstances for stolen material that is inventoried at a public institution, for
property that is in jeopardy of pillage, or for property deemed "inalienable" by
the exporting state. It is significant that not only source nations, but many
market nations have signed the Convention. 39 The Convention would appear to
forbid museums from acquiring antiquities illegally exported after the date of the
Convention and call for the state to require restitution. However, not all parties
have ratified the Convention, including the US.

34

Prior to the UNESCO Convention, the only international convention dealing with cultural
property focused on its preservation during times of war. See Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, 249 UN Treaty Set 215
(1954).

35

Gibbon, Cbronology of Cuturalat5 (cited in note 33).
UNESCO Convention, art 7(b).

36

37
38

39

UNESCO Convention, art 9.
UNESCO Convention, art 13.
For a complete list of states party, see US Department of State, States Par/j to the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, available online at <http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/unesco02.html> (visited Jan
15, 2007). Note that the market nations of the UK, the US, and Japan are parties to the
agreement.
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B. THE US CULTURAL PROPERTY REGIME
As a major art importing nation that traditionally supports a free market, it
is unsurprising that the general policy in the US has been not to enforce the
export laws of other countries. 4 It is also not surprising that the US has few
cultural property export controls of its own.41 From a legal perspective, this US
policy can be seen in its legislative ratification of the UNESCO Convention,
executive implementation via the bilateral agreements, and judicial forays into
cultural property restitution claims.
1. The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
In accordance with US reservations at the time of signing the UNESCO
Convention,42 and the US policy of not enforcing foreign export controls, the
US has not ratified the Convention in its entirety. The 1983 Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act ("CPIA")43 in essence merely implements
Articles 7(b) and 9 of the UNESCO Convention, thus enforcing export controls
under two conditions.' First, agreement authority is provided in Section 303 of
the CPIA for the President to implement import controls at the request of a
state party by negotiating a bilateral agreement if four statutory determinations
are met.45 Second, emergency authority is provided in Section 304 of the CPIA
for the President to unilaterally implement import controls on archeological or
ethnological material in lieu of a formal bilateral agreement as set forth in
Section 303 of the CPIA.46 The US therefore selectively enforces export controls

40
41

42

See Bator, 34 Stan L Rev at 287 (cited in note 13).
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub L No 101-601, 104 Stat 3048
(1990), codified at 25 USC §§ 3001-13 (2000), is one of the few exceptions.
Gibbon, Chronology of Cultural at 5-6 (cited in note 33).

43

Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act ("CPIA'", Pub L No 97-446, 96 Stat 2329
(1983), codified at 19 USC §§ 2601-13 (2000).

44

The focus here is on export controls of non-inventoried objects resting in situ covered in Article 9
of the UNESCO Convention such that only § 303-04 of the CPIA are within the scope of this
Comment.

45

CPIA § 303, 96 Stat at 2602. The four requisite determinations for a bilateral agreement include:
(1)the archaeological or ethnological material is in jeopardy from pillaging, (2) the source nation
has implemented measures to protect its cultural heritage, (3) the application of import
restrictions if applied in concert with other countries having substantial import trade in the
material will deter the pillaging and less drastic measures are not available, and (4) import
restrictions will be consistent with the "general interest of the international community in the
interchange of cultural property." Id.
CPIA § 304, 96 Stat at 2603. Emergency authority may be invoked provided that the material
meets one of three conditions: (1) has importance for understanding history and is in jeopardy
from "pillaging, dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation," (2) comes from a site of "high cultural

46
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of source nations in the form of import controls, but only if the statutory criteria
are met, and certainly does not undertake the sweeping enforcement of foreign
export controls required by Article 13 of the UNESCO Convention.
2. The Cultural Property
of Understanding

Advisory

Committee

and

Memoranda

Responsibility for administering the CPIA is with the US Department of
State ("State Department"), which makes the statutory determinations to impose
import restrictions through bilateral agreement and emergency action.47 Analysis
and review of requests for import restrictions occurs through the Cultural
Property Advisory Committee ("CPAC"), which is composed of professionals
and experts in the cultural property field and makes recommendations to the
State Department.48 A favorable determination for the source nation by CPAC
and the State Department results in emergency import controls or a renewable
five-year bilateral agreement called a Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU"). 49 Specifically, prohibited materials are published as a list in the federal
register and may be imported into the US only if accompanied by an export
certificate from the source nation or evidence demonstrating the object was
removed from the source nation prior to the effective date of the MOU.50 The
US has entered into bilateral agreements with twelve nations, including Italy."*
3. Source Nations' Legal Options
Source nations have several mechanisms through which to make a claim
for restitution of an antiquity from a US museum. First, if the object is stolen,
meaning taken from an inventoried public institution or a private party, the state

48

significance" if the site is in jeopardy, or (3) comprises partial remains of a past culture in
jeopardy. Id.
See generally US Department of State, Background: An Introductionto InternationalCulturalProperij
Protectionin the U.S., available online at <http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/backgrnd.html>
(visited Jan 15, 2007).
The CPAC is composed of professionals in the fields of archaeology, anthropology, and

49

ethnology, and experts in the international trade in cultural property, and notably, two spaces on
the eleven-member committee are reserved for persons representing museums-an important
recognition of the role of museums in the preservation of cultural property. See US Department
of State, The President's Cultural Properly Advisory Committee, available online at <http://
exchanges.state.gov/culprop/committee.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
CPIA § 303, 96 Stat at 2602.

s0

CPIA

51

For a list of past and current import controls under CPIA, see US Department of State, Chart of

47

§ 307,

96 Stat at 2606.

Current and Expired Import Restoictions Under the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act,
available online at <http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/chart.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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or private party can claim restitution under the CPIA. 2 Second, if the object is
not stolen, it may still be illicitly traded if in violation of the ownership and
export laws of the source nation. 3 Usually, the source nation will have a prior
law claiming ownership to all antiquities found in its soil after a certain date, thus
vesting ownership of the cultural property with the state, and in conjunction
with an export law, rendering it illegal in that country to export the object.
However, this alone does not suffice to claim restitution in US courts, since the
US does not generally enforce foreign export controls, 4 and accordingly, only
selectively implemented the UNESCO Convention. The date of the relevant
CPIA action is important for these claims. If the object is exported after the
effective date of emergency import controls or a MOU, and falls within the class
of objects specified, 5 then the source nation can claim restitution under the
CPIA and the US is obligated to take necessary measures to return the
property.5 6 However, if there is no MOU or the object is exported before its
effective date, as is case with the Krater, then it is more difficult for a source
nation to claim restitution as the issue becomes whether the court will recognize
the foreign cultural patrimony laws.
US courts resolve this issue by looking to the McClain Doctrine to
determine liability of the property holder.5 7 The theory in McClain was that under
the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA', which prohibits the transportation
of goods in interstate commerce known to be stolen, converted, or taken by
fraud, 8 goods that are illegally exported should be considered stolen. The Fifth
Circuit held that illegal exportation of goods will in fact be considered theft and
thus stolen under the NSPA if there is a declaration of national ownership in the
cultural property.59 Thus, the "knowing importation of cultural property subject
to a clear declaration of ownership by a foreign nation is grounds for the
criminal prosecution of the importer by the US under the [National] Stolen
Property Act."6 There were questions regarding the soundness of this doctrine
52

CPIA §308, 96 Stat at 2607 (codifying Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention prohibiting the
export of stolen cultural property).

53

For a general discussion of export controls and ownership laws and their distinguishing
characteristics, see O'Keefe, 10 SyrJ Intl L & Comm at 357-69 (cited in note 18).

54

See id at 362.

55

CPIA

56

CPIA

57

UnitedStates vMcClain, 545 F2d 988 (5th Cir 1977).
National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA"), 18 USC §§ 2314-15 (2000).

58
59
60

§ 305, 96
§310, 96

Stat at 2604.
Stat at 2609.

McClain, 545 F2d at 1000-01. The court undertook a detailed analysis of what the defendants
actually knew, thus showing the importance of the scienter requirement in the NSPA.
William G. Pearlstein, Cultural Propery, Congress, the Courts, and Customs, in Gibbon, ed, Who Owns
the Past? 9, 10 (cited in note 33).
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when the CPIA was subsequently enacted,6 but the McClain Doctrine's
continuing validity was reaffirmed in 2003 by the Second Circuit holding that the
CPIA is not "the exclusive means of dealing with stolen artifacts and
antiquities. 62 The case demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between
mere export controls and true ownership laws--only the latter coming under the
63
purview of the NSPA.
However, both the Schultz and McClain cases were criminal prosecutions by
the US government against private dealers, not state actions for restitution. In
another case, Italy was able to reclaim an antiquity through a federal in rem
forfeiture action brought by the US.64 It is significant that even in this latter case,
liability and remedy were predicated on the NSPA because it suggests that if a
source nation proceeds under federal law,6 any action for restitution or criminal
liability will have to be based on the NSPA.
Applying this regime to the Krater, Italy's claim of restitution under federal
law hinges on the Met's knowledge of the Krater's provenance at the time of
acquisition. The SchultZ analysis of the Italian law in determining whether it is
merely export or true ownership would likely not be at issue since at least one
court has characterized the Italian patrimony law as capable of falling under the
NSPA.66 The case would then turn on the scienter requirement of the NSPA and
whether the Met knew the Krater was illegally exported from Italy. Thus,
evidence as to the Krater's provenance and what the curators and acquisition

61

62
63
64

65

66

The CPIA was implemented with its strict statutory requirements for imposing import controls
thus reaffirming the US policy against blanket recognition of export controls in favor of the free
international movement of goods. It was thought that the McClain Doctrine's blanket recognition
would be overruled, and in fact, legislation was under review in the US Senate to this effect, but it
was never passed. Id at 10-11.
UnitedStates v Schul,- 333 F3d 393, 410 (2d Cir 2003).
Id. The Second Circuit undertook a detailed textual analysis of the Egyptian law and weighed the
testimony of various experts in Egyptian law.
United States v An Anlique Platterof Gold, 184 F3d 131 (2d Cir 1999). The dealer was required to
return the object after having made misrepresentations on custom forms, which ultimately
brought the case under the purview of the NSPA since Italy had laws vesting ownership in the
state.
There is also the possibility of proceeding under state law in an action for replevin. See, for
example, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v Goldbergand Feldman Fine Arts, Inc, 917 F2d
278 (7th Cir 1990) (holding Cyprus was able to achieve restitution of the mosaics); Republic of
Turkey v The MetropolitanMuseum ofArt, 762 F Supp 44 (SDNY 1990) (settling before trial granting
Turkey restitution in light of the evidence mounting against the Met regarding knowledge of the
smuggling and looting).
See An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F3d 131.
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committee knew, would be crucial.6" Note that a state law action for replevin is
not available to Italy regarding the Krater because the statute of limitations has
likely run. 68 Although the Accord now renders litigation impossible, the potential
for litigation was important because each party's assessment of the likelihood of
achieving restitution in court affected the procedural and substantive aspects of
the Accord.69
The litigation model is an inadequate means for Italy to achieve restitution
in this dispute. Since state action for restitution is foreclosed, and the Krater's
export and excavation precede US implementation of the UNESCO Convention
and the US-Italy bilateral agreement, Italy's case is dependent upon a federal
action under the NSPA. It is not surprising that Italy employed an alternative
model to achieve restitution in light of the NSPA's messy scienter requirement.
Through litigation, Italy could have at best hoped for criminal liability with likely
substantial litigation costs.
III. THE ITALIAN MODEL
This section explores the Italian Model whereby resolution of cultural
property disputes is achieved outside of US courts in favor of a more
cooperative approach between museums and nations. The Model will be laid out
in several parts, beginning with an overview of Italy's cultural property regime,
continuing with a background on the Krater, and concluding with an
examination of the Accord.

67

68

69

This evidence will be detailed later in the Comment, but suffice to say, in light of the Medici
conviction and the documents and photographs obtained during that case, it is likely Italy had a
strong claim to restitution.
In New York, the presumable location of action given that the Met is located in New York City,
the statute of limitations is three years from the time the action accrues, and in the case of a good
faith purchaser, an action does not accrue until the claimed-owner makes a demand for the
object's return and is refused. Republic of Turkey, 762 F Supp at 45. Furthermore, the demand must
be within a reasonable time after the possessor is identified. DeWeerth v Baldinger,836 F2d 103, 108
(2d Cir 1987). Given that the Met's acquisition of the Krater was a public event in 1972 and that
demands for its return were made throughout the final decades of the last century, at the time
when the Accord was signed, it is likely the statute of limitations had run, thus precluding Italy
from bringing a suit under state law.
The Met likely only agreed to negotiate because it believed Italy had a strong case. For decades
the Met had rebuffed Italy's claims for restitution. Similarly, Italy's belief in the strength of its case
likely spurred it to seek a resolution outside of court because the likelihood of success in court
would have bolstered Italy's negotiating position vis-i-vis the Met, thus allowing Italy to achieve a
favorable settlement of the dispute while avoiding costly litigation.
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A. THE ITALIAN CULTURAL PROPERTY REGIME
1. The National Retention Scheme
Italy, as a major source nation with a wealth of antiquities, utilizes a strict
cultural property regime based on a 1939 law vesting ownership in the state for
all objects of "artistic, historical, archaeological, or ethnological interest" found
in the ground during excavations or by chance in the state, and rendering it
illegal to export such items without an export license.70 The presumption is that
the object belongs to the state unless a possessor is able to prove private
ownership prior to 1902."' These laws enable Italy to legally retain most of its
cultural property by declaring stolen any property illegally excavated and
exported out of the country and prevent the export of anything more than fifty
years old.72 This system allows Italy to make reasonable cases for restitution in
the event its cultural patrimony is stolen and furthermore, pursuant to its signing
of the UNESCO Convention, 3 to take measures to prevent their illegal export.

2. The Carabinieri and Tombaroli
To enforce the stringent legal protection of its cultural property, Italy
employs one of the best police units in the world. The Arma dei Carabinieri
("Carabinieri"), or Italian paramilitary police, via a specialized unit to protect the
Italian cultural heritage known as the Tutela Patrimonio Cuturale ("TPC"), have
been world leaders in catching art and antiquities thieves.7 4 The TPC's
extraordinary ability to recover stolen art and antiquities has garnered
international acclaim leading many world leaders to call upon their services to
assist in cultural property cases around the globe. 75 It is significant that Italy has

invested in the creation of an efficient and effective squad to protect cultural
property because it is a statutory prerequisite under the CPIA before the US may

71

Law of 1 June 1939 XVI, No 1089 Concerning the Protection of Objects of Artistic and
Historical Interest, printed in Lyndel V. Prott and Patrick J. O'Keefe, Handbook of National
Regulations Concerningthe Export of CulturalPropery (UNESCO 1988).
AnAntique Platterof Gold, 184 F3d at 134.

72

See Park, 23 U PaJ Intl Econ L at 940 (cited in note 9).

73

US Department of State, States Pary to the 1970 UNESCO Convention (cited in note 39).

74

Consider Saving Antiquities for Everyone, Policing Aniquiies in Ita/y: The Carabinieri Art Squad,
available online at <http://www.savingantiquities.org/Carabinieri.doc> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

75

The TPC has been called upon, for example, to stop the plundering of Iraq, see Saving Antiquities
for Everyone, Say Yes to Itay: Renew BilateralAgreement that Restricts U.S. Import of Antiquities,
available online at <http://www.savingantiquities.org/i-safe-mouitalyinfo.php#what> (visited
Jan 15, 2007), and also has teamed up with China to protect its rich cultural history, see Lucian
Harris, China andItaly Team Up to Fight Illicit Trade, Art Newspaper (Mar 2006).

70
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employ import controls. 7 6 It is paradoxical why nations should undertake to
protect the cultural patrimony of foreign nations when those nations do not
themselves undertake protective measures.
Another explanation for why Italy invests so much in the proficiency of its
Carabinieri is the extent of its looting problem. Italy houses half of the UNdesignated world heritage sites and is a native repository for antiquities of the
Romans, Etruscans in central Italy, Greeks in Sicily, and Phoenicians in Lazio.7 7
Given Italy's extensive collection of antiquities, the demand for them 78 and their
profit-generating capabilities,79 it is no wonder that some take advantage of this
by literally searching for buried treasure. The tombaroli are Italian grave robbers
who break into burial chambers to take the antiquities and sell them to
middlemen and dealers.80 Under the cover of night and outside the reach of the
Carabinieri, tombaroli take the best antiquities and smash the rest-those not
destroyed are disintegrated from exposure to the air. 81 To illustrate the extent of
the tombaroli problem, between the end of World War II and 1962, four hundred
out of five hundred fifty tombs were looted at just one Etruscan cemetery in
Cerveteri, the same city where the Krater was found. Between 1970 and 1996,
the Carabinieri recovered more than three-hundred thousand "unofficially"
excavated antiquities, while a single raid on a Sicilian villa in 1998 yielded more
than thirty thousand Phoenician, Greek, and Roman antiquities.8 2 With every
antiquity looted by the tombaroli, and thus not scientifically excavated, mankind's
potential for understanding past cultures is increasingly limited.
3. The US-Italy Memorandum of Understanding
In light of the severe looting of its cultural patrimony, and pursuant to the
UNESCO Convention, Italy petitioned the US under the CPIA to institute

§ 303

76

Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act

77

See Rory Carroll, Weekend: Loot: Italy is Home to Countless Hidden Tombs and Burial Chambers Bearing
Antiquities Dating Back Thousands of Years. ForAcademics and Archaeologists They Are HistoricalTreasure
Troves, butfor an Illicit Band of Criminals They Are a Passportinto a Billion-pound InternationalSmuggling
Operation. Rosy Carrollon the Racket and the Racketeers, London Guardian 44 (May 4, 2002). See also
US Department of State, Itay: U.S. Protection of ArchaeologicalMaterial Representing the Pre-Classical,
Classical,and Imperial Roman Periods, Background, available online at <http://exchanges.state.gov/
culprop/itfact.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Brodie, Dole, and Watson, Stealing Histogy at 23-25 (cited in note 24).

78
79

80
81
82

(a)(1)(B), 96 Stat at 2602.

It is estimated that 98 percent of the profit from looted antiquities goes to the middlemen. Id at
13.
Carroll, The Ransack of Italy's History (cited in note 77).
Rose George, The Great Smash and Grab,The Independent on Sunday (May 1, 2005). available
online at <http://www.savingantiquities.org/Thegreatsmashandgrab.doc> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Brodie, Dole, and Watson, Stealing History at 19 (cited in note 24).
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import restrictions to help stem the demand for Italian antiquities. 3 This
resulted in the 2001 Italy Memorandum of Understanding ("Italy MOU") and
the subsequent 2006 renewal of the Italy MOU to protect pre-Classical,
Classical, and Imperial Roman archeological material,"' on which import
restrictions are placed." Because import restrictions under other MOUs have
garnered some criticism for being overly restrictive and in violation of US policy
of not enforcing foreign export controls, 8 6 it is significant that the Italy MOU
vigorously promotes international exchange and cooperation. The agreement
calls for long-term loans of archaeological or artistic items of interest, joint
excavation projects between Italy and US museums and universities, and
academic exchanges.87 Finally, the agreement also provides for a strengthening
of protection within Italy by requiring increased training of the Carabinieri and
intensification of their investigations, and the establishment of more severe
penalties for looters.88
4. Italian Foreign Cultural Policy
The final piece of the Italian cultural property regime, and a crucial element
of the Model, is the aggressive pursuit to restore Italy's cultural heritage led by
Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("Ministry"). 89 While Italy has made claims for
83

US Department of State, tal: US Protection (cited in note 77).

84

85

Id. For a list of the specific objects in the federal register, see Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in
Italy and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods, 19 CFR § 12
(2006).
The Italy MOU prohibits the importation into the US of "archaeological material ranging in date

86

from approximately the 9th century B.C. to approximately the 4th century A.D., including
categories of stone, metal, ceramic and glass artifacts, and wall paintings . . . unless the
Government of the Republic of Italy issues a license or other documentation which certifies that
such importation was not in violation of its laws." Agreement between the Government of the
US and the Government of the Republic of Italy Concerning the Imposition of Import
Restrictions on Categories of Archaeological Material Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical and
Imperial Roman Periods of Italy ("Italy MOU"), art 1, 40 ILM 1031 (2001).
See, for example, James F. Fitzpatrick, Stealth UNIDROF. Is USIA the Villain?, 31 NYU J Intl L

87

& Pol 47, 55-75 (1998) (critiquing the US-Canada and US-Peru MOUs).
Italy MOU, art 2 (cited in note 85). For more information on these cooperative endeavors, see US
Department of State, Integrated Project Italy-USA: Cultural Exchanges and Exhibitions in Archaeology,
available online at <http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/itexhib.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007)
(showing examples of joint excavations and academic exchanges); US Department of State,
Guidelines. Loans of Arcbaeological Material Under the 2001 U.S.-Itay Memorandum of Understanding,
available online at <http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/itloangl.html> (visited Jan 15, 2007)
(showing long-term loan guidelines).

88
89

Italy MOU, arts 1-2 (cited in note 85).
The Directorate General for Cultural Promotion and Cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, among other things, is responsible for recovering works of art exported illegally. See
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restitution of its antiquities for decades, museums were not always quick to
comply.9" Italy would make demands, and museums such as the Met would
respond by demanding incontrovertible proof of provenance 9 or, in the case of
the Getty, by taking measures to get around their acquisition policies.9 2
However, since the late 1990s, Italy has intensified its pursuit by going after
museums in foreign courts, criminally prosecuting dealers and curators in Italian
courts, and negotiating bilateral agreements while strengthening the investigative
capabilities of the Carabinieri. In 1999, Italy successfully reacquired the antique
platter of gold from the Met after petitioning the US government to bring suit
against the museum.93 In 2001, Italy negotiated the Italy MOU to enforce its
export controls.94 In April 2004, Italy persuaded the US government to file a
forfeiture action against the Getty to return the Asteas Krater it illicitly acquired
in 1981. 9' Significantly, the Asteas Krater was not returned until November 2005
when Italy indicted former Getty antiquities curator Marion True in an Italian
criminal prosecution, signaling the restitution was an effort by the Getty to
maintain good relations with Italy.9 6
The True case was part of a larger strategy to go after the major players in
the art world by subjecting them to criminal liability in Italian court. In 2004,
Italian prosecutors convicted famed antiquities dealer Giacomo Medici,
imposing a ten-year prison term.97 Evidence acquired from investigations of
Medici enabled Italy to try True and prominent antiquities dealer Robert Hecht

91

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DirectorateGeneralforCultural Promotion and Cooperation,available online
at <http://www.esteri.it/eng/2 10.126.asp> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
See, for example, Slayman, The Trial in Rome at 4-5 (cited in note 29) (telling how investigations of
the Krater since the 1972 Met acquisition resulted in little cooperation and even standoffishness
on the part of the Met); Jason Felch, The Getty Returns 3 Ancient Artifacts to Itajy, LA Times A31
(Nov 10, 2005) (discussing the Getty's return of three antiquities to Italy).
See Randy Kennedy and Hugh Eakin, The Met, Ending 30-Year Stance, Is Set to Yield Prized Vase to

92

Ita#y, NY Times Al (Feb 2, 2006); Vernon Silver, Italy Lacks ProofMet's Antique Pots Were Looted,
Papers Show, Bloomberg News (Nov 30, 2005).
See Slayman, The Trial in Rome at 5, 7-8 (cited in note 29) (discussing how Getty curator Marion

90

93

True was able to get around the 1995 Getty acquisition policy of not acquiring works unpublished
prior to 1995 in acquiring the largely unprovenanced Fleischman collection by itself publishing
the collection in 1994).
See An Antique Gold Platter,184 F3d at 132.

94

See Italy MOU (cited in note 85).

95

See Slayman, The Trial in Rome at 10-11 (cited in note 29). In this exchange, the Getty also
returned an Etruscan candelabrum and Greek funerary inscription.
See Felch, The Gety Returns at 1 (cited in note 90).

96
97

See Suzan Mazur, The Medici Go-Round: Sotheby's & the Signed Euphronios,Scoop Indep News (Dec
1, 2005), available online at <http://wvw.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0512/S0017.htm> (visited
Jan 15, 2007).
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in Spring 2005 for conspiring to traffic in antiquities.98 The True prosecution is
unprecedented because True is the first American curator to be criminally
prosecuted in a foreign court for trafficking in antiquities.99 More importantly,
True is the former antiquities curator at the Getty Museum, one of the richest
and most renowned museums in the world and a prominent collector of
antiquities.'0 0 This signals the Ministry's willingness and ability to go after even
the most important players in the global antiquities trade, potentially rendering
no one above prosecution.' 0 ' After successfully negotiating for the renewal of
the Italy MOU in January 2006, this aggressive strategy culminated in the
February 2006 accord with the Met to reacquire the Krater, an unprecedented
privately negotiated, voluntary restitution by a museum. The Accord, and its lack
of precedent, form the basis of the Model and is the subject of the next section.
B. THE EUPHRONIOS KRATER
Since the unprecedented $1.2 million acquisition in 1972 by the Met of the
2,500 year old Krater,1 2 there has been much debate as to its origin. The refusal
of then-Met director Thomas Hoving and Dietrich von Bothmer, Met curator of
the Greek and Roman collection, to reveal the identities of the vase's previous
owner and the dealer who sold it to the museum sparked investigations by the
Carabinieri, the New York Police Department, and the FBI. 103 From these
investigations Italian officials concluded that the Krater was illegally smuggled
from Italy in 1971.1' Robert Hecht05 was discovered to be the dealer but the
investigations yielded conflicting views of the object's provenance, and Italy
backed off from the Met.0 6 These efforts were renewed when a 1995 raid on
98

Id. The True-Hecht trial is still in progress as of the time of this Comment.

99

Slayman, The Trial in Rame at 1 (cited in note 29).

100

See Riding, Why 'Antiquities Trials' at 2 (cited in note 31) (suggesting that the Getty's financial
ability to make significant acquisitions is unique).
101 It is possible that museum directors, trustees, and prominent collectors could be next. See Jason

102
103

Horowitz, How Hot Vase It?, NY Observer 1 (Feb 20, 2006) (discussing the connection between
collector Shelby White and the Met and the possibility of Italy going after her private collection).
See Povoledo, Italy and U.S. Sign (cited in note 1).
Saving Antiquities for Everyone, Italy and the Met: Three Decades of Controvery Finally Resolved?,
available online at < http://www.savingantiquities.org/h-featureltaly.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).

104

Id.

105

Robert Hecht is a famous American art dealer who is on trial with Marion True for trafficking in

106

looted objects to the Getty after a 2001 raid on his Paris apartment unearthed evidence of an
international antiquities trafficking operation and connections with Medici. See Kennedy and
Eakin, The Met, Endingat Al (cited in note 91).
Armando Cenere, a member of the tombarv/i, claimed to have been involved in the looting of the
Krater from a tomb near Cerveteri while in contrast, a witness claimed she had seen the Krater
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Swiss warehouses belonging to Italian antiquities dealer Giacomo Medici yielded
documents and photographs revealing a massive antiquities trafficking operation
that linked Medici to Hecht and the Krater, ultimately resulting in Medici's 2004
criminal conviction in Rome. 10 7 However, it was not until 2001 that former Met
Director Hoving solved the riddle of the conflicting provenances by discovering
that there were actually two vases, and the one claimed to be seen by a witness
was not the Krater acquired by the Met but rather a fraud put on by Hecht.10 8
Discussions between the Met and Italy resumed in 2005 culminating in February
2006 with the Accord.1" 9 During these events, the Met refused to abandon its
long-held position that the Krater was not illicitly traded 1 until talks resumed in
November of 2005-the same time that Hecht and True went on trial in
Italy"'--ostensibly the result of the hardball strategy pursued by the Italian
government.
C. THE ACCORD
The Accord represents a novel approach to restitution claims with its
absolution of liability, vesting of ownership in Italy, and call for cooperation
between Italy and the Met.' 12 First, the Accord calls for a transfer of title to all
the items covered in the agreement.' 13 This is significant because the cultural4
property debate revolves around the central question of who owns the past,"
and in this regard the Met conceded that true ownership, if illegally exported, lies
with the source nation. Specifically, the Krater will be allowed to remain at the

107

with its same paintings in fragments in the home of the alleged owner in 1964 and both stories
became convoluted. Saving Antiquities for Everyone, Italy and the Met (cited in note 103).
Kennedy and Eakin, The Met, Ending at Al (cited in note 91).

108

Saving Antiquities for Everyone, Italy and the Met (cited in note 103).

109

Id.

110

Kennedy and Eakin, The Met, Ending at Al (cited in note 91) (discussing the Met "abandon[ing] its
longstanding position that Italy's grievances were without merit").

111 Id.

Agreement between The Ministry for Cultural Assets and Activities of the Italian Republic and
The Metropolitan Museum of Art ("Accord") (Feb 21, 2006), printed in Suzan Mazur, The ItayMet EuphroniosAccord?, Scoop Independent News (Feb 22, 2006), available online at <http://
www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0602/S00265.htm> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
113 Id at art 2. Note that in addition to the Krater, the agreement calls for a return of a Laconian
kylix, Apulian Dinos, psykter, Attic amphora, and the Hellenistic Silver. Id at arts 3, 5. For a
discussion on the discovery of the true provenance of the Hellenistic Silver, see Maura Singleton,
Plunder The Theft of the MorgantinaSilver, U Va Mag 38 (Spring 2006).
114 See David Bonetti, Curators, Counhies Debate Who Owns the Past,St. Louis Post-Dispatch B1 (Feb
26, 2006).
112
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museum until January 2008 with the label, "Lent by the Republic of Italy.""' 5
Second, in exchange for the transfer of title once the Krater is returned, Italy will
make four-year loans to the museum on a rotating basis of a selection of
archaeological objects or objects of "equivalent beauty and artistic/historical
significance, mutually agreed upon."" 6 This is a recognition of both the
importance of museums in displaying cultural patrimony to the public and the
necessity for cultural exchange between nations. In March 2006, Italy announced
the specific artifacts that will be used for the loans.' 7 In the same spirit of
cooperation, the agreement also calls for excavations in Italy conducted by the
Met and the subsequent displaying of discovered artifacts through long-term
loans at the Met, while recognizing Italian ownership." 8 Finally, the Accord
waives the possibility of litigation by Italy against the Met, whether civil or
criminal, for any of the requested items." 9 This provision is important because it
is doubtful the Met would have signed the Accord without it, and it indicates
Italy's willingness to pursue restitution claims outside the judicial context and
achieve an amicable end to cultural property disputes.
D. THE MODEL
The premise underlying the Model is that Italy's demonstration of the
seriousness of its commitment to restore its cultural property by any means
necessary pushes museums to negotiate, and once in negotiations, Italy can force
a desirable outcome. Prior to the Model, museums were usually unwilling to
seriously negotiate since they knew that if they simply denied any wrongdoing,
most of the time the claim would not be pursued further. In the rare instance the
case was brought in a US court, there was the buffer of a high burden of proof
on the source nation to show the museum had knowledge of the piece's illicit
history. However, the combination of criminal prosecutions in Rome against
high-profile museum curators and major international art dealers and the
announcement of investigations concerning the antiquities collections at several
prominent American museums has put pressure on museum directors and
curators to examine their antiquities collections and agree to negotiate or face
trial in Rome. Once in negotiations, Italy achieves considerable bargaining power
Accord, art 4.1(a) (cited in note 112).
Id at art 4.1(b) (listing twelve specific archaeological artifacts as possibilities for use in long-term
loans).
117 For a list of antiquities eligible for the loans, see Elisabetta Povoledo, Itay Makes Its Choices of
Antiquities to Lend to the Met, NY Times E2 (Mar 15, 2006).
118 Accord, art 6 (requiring their display be accompanied with a sign, "Lent by the Republic of Italy.")
(cited in note 112).
119 Id at art 8.3.
115
116
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by making clear it will refuse to lend art and antiquities to uncooperative
museums for temporary exhibitions. Amidst this dual pressure, Italy then offers
museums a way out by waiving all liability and responsibility for the illicit
dealings, which is good for museum public relations and assuring a source of
materials for future exhibitions, in exchange for what Italy desired: restitution
and ownership transfer of the cultural property.

IV. ANALYZING THE MODEL
The Model ushers in the possibility of a new approach to cultural property
disputes. It could force museums to enact more stringent provenance standards
for acquisitions and loans and also foster a new spirit of cooperation between
museums and source nations in stopping the illicit antiquities trade. 120 More
importantly, it bypasses the American judicial system by selectively employing
criminal litigation in the source nation to force future extrajudicial, private
settlements. Nevertheless, before heralding the Model as an unqualified success,
one must consider whether it is replicable. Can it serve as a universal template by
which other nations can effectively achieve restitution from museums or was the
Krater's restitution simply a product of the factual circumstances surrounding
the dispute? This section will analyze the Model's impact on the art world and
conclude that although the Model is unlikely to be perfectly replicated, its
success is not contingent on exact replication because it will positively impact
the art world in other ways.
A. IS THE MODEL REPLICABLE?
1. The Antiquity
Several factors render the Model's ability to be replicated problematic. The
antiquity at stake was not an inconspicuous, unknown piece of comparatively
little monetary value. Rather, it was a centerpiece of the Met's Greek and Roman
Galleries. 121 The Krater's acquisition for over one million dollars made frontpage headlines 122 and was more than seven times the purchase price ever paid for
an ancient vase.123 The 2,500 year old Krater is just one of a handful of vases

120

121

122
123

See The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Statement by the MetropolitanMuseum ofArt on Its Agreement
with Italian Ministr of Culture (Feb 21, 2006), available online at <http://www.metmuseum.org/
pressroom/fullrelease.asp?prid= {F9704AC3-297B-4704-999B-111ACC8E6804}> (visited Jan
15, 2007).
See Hugh Eakin, Italy Goes on the Offensive with Aniquilies: Seeks Deal with Museums over Disputed
Objects, NY Times El (Dec 26, 2005).
See Kennedy and Eakin, The Met, Ending (cited in note 91).
Saving Antiquities for Everyone, Italy and the Met (cited in note 103).
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signed by Greek master sculptor Euphronios and what Thomas124 Hoving
described as "one of the ten greatest creations of Western civilization.'
If the object at issue was of lesser importance or value, it is not clear that
Italy would have spent over thirty years investigating its provenance and
negotiating for its recovery. This is not to say that Italy would not have made a
restitution claim, but it certainly affected the priority the Ministry and Carabinieri
gave to achieving its repatriation. This in turn would affect the quantum of
evidence of illegal export and ultimately weaken Italy's bargaining position vis-avis the Met. The more evidence Italy amassed on the Met's knowledge of the
illegal export, the greater the likelihood of winning in US courts under the CPIA
and NSPA, and thus the more disastrous the consequences for the Met not
settling. The Model's effectiveness may therefore be limited by the stature of the
work.
2. The Museum
Because the museum in question was the Met, it renders the ability to
replicate problematic. The Accord was reached at a time when the Met was
planning the opening of The Leon Levy and Shelby White Court for Roman and
Etruscan Art. 12 ' This is significant for two reasons. First, at a time when the
museum was investing nine hundred million dollars in renovations and additions
for this court and other projects, 26 it could ill afford to become embroiled in a
lengthy court battle, which would promise to be publicly embarrassing. 127 This
was especially true given the stature of the museum and the Krater being
excavated from an Etruscan tomb. The fact that the museum was in large part
publicly funded, 128 and a major tourist attraction in New York City, 129 only
heightened the probability of an extremely public trial.

124

Russell Berman, Met Chiefto Discuss I-lot Pot' in Rome, NY Sun 1 (Nov 11, 2005).

125

See The Metropolitan Museum of Art, MetropolitanMuseum Launches '21st-Centuy Met' (Feb 24,
2004), available online at <http://www.metmuseum.org/pressroom/full_
release.asp?prid= {90102F4E-2E06-4C28-BC52-785EF36F68B9} > (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Id.
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See Hugh Eakin and Elisabetta Povoledo, Met's Fearson Looted Anliquiies Are Not New, NY Times
El (Feb 20, 2006) (discussing the Italian prosecutors use of the American press to influence
public opinion concerning the criminal trial of Marion True).
The City of New York provides the museum with not only land (the museum is on public
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property), but pays its heat, light, and power expenses, half the cost of maintenance and security
of the collections, and is responsible for 15 percent of the museum's revenue. The Metropolitan
Museum of Art, An Overview of the Museum, available online at <http://www.metmuseum.org/
press room/fulLrelease.asp?prid= {9FF384DF-9FEA-4220-8634-D1684C00E35D}> (visited
Jan 15, 2007).
5.2 million people visited the Met in 1998. Id.
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Second, in light of the opening of new galleries, it was also important for
the museum to have an assured source of objects to exhibit. Although the Met
had extensive permanent collections, it was important that the Met maintain
good relations with Italy in order to call upon it in the future for loans of major
works. As part of Italy's strategy, Italian Culture Minister Rocco Buttiglioni
announced it would be aggressive with using loans of art to get museums to
return antiquities, 130 and according to Giuseppe Proietti, an Italian official
responsible for archaeology, Italy would deny loans to museums that buy illicit
works.' Italy, for example, denied the Getty's request for a loan from the
Naples Archaeological Museum of bronzes for the opening of the museum's
Getty Villa (a new building to house the antiquities collection) at the same time
that Getty antiquities curator Marion True was indicted for trafficking in stolen
antiquities. 13 2 So, the quid pro quo of antiquities for loans was a centerpiece of
the Accord"' and a crucial factor in bringing the Met to the table.' The assured
source of loan material may not be as important for other museums, especially
those relying more on permanent collections or private collectors, those not as
focused on exhibiting Greek and Roman antiquities as the Met, or those not
opening a new wing for Mediterranean antiquities.
3. The Source Nation
Italy is unique from other source nations in key respects that could limit
the applicability of the Model to Italian restitution claims. Many other nations
are not as rich in antiquities and art as Italy. The negotiating position of the
source country is contingent on its ability to threaten to bar access to its art as a
source of loans. Italy was able to achieve the Accord in large part because the
Met relied upon Italy's significant collection of works by Italian Renaissance and
Baroque masters and upon Italy's plethora of ancient Greek and Roman art to
assemble exhibitions. The Model could thus be limited to source nations that
have substantial art and antiquity resources or that enjoy high demand for their
cultural patrimony.'35

130

See Hugh Eakin, Italy Using Art Loans to Regain Aniquiies, Intl Herald Trib 10 (Dec 28, 2005).
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Id.
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Id.
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Accord art 4.1 (cited in note 112).

134

See Randy Kennedy and Hugh Eakin, Met Chief, Unbowed, Defends Museum's Role, NY Times El
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(Feb 28, 2006) (telling that Met director Montebello initiated the idea of "exchange for loans" and
that good relations with Italy are important for borrowing works for major exhibitions).
There is a counter-argument to be made that source nations can link returns of antiquities to
things other than future art loans. The problem with this though, is that it is not clear what source
nations could offer (besides art loans) that would be of any value to museums.
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Other nations may not take necessary measures to protect their cultural
patrimony as diligently as Italy. 3 6 The argument for restitution is stronger when
a source nation has the ability to protect its cultural heritage domestically
because preservation of the object is of the utmost importance for both
museums and source nations. If the object is unlikely to be preserved in the
source nation because that country is unwilling or unable to undertake
protections, either due to lack of the rule of law, or lack of the economic
resources necessary to protect the objects from theft and adverse environmental
conditions, then the source nation will have a weaker claim to restitution.
This is one of the factors bolstering the British Museum's refusal to
repatriate to Greece the Elgin Marbles that were taken from the Parthenon. 37
Allowing the objects to remain in Greece would have exposed them to years of
destructive natural forces. The first frieze of the Parthenon was returned by a
museum to Greece only after it announced plans to build the New Acropolis
Museum capable of preserving and displaying the Elgin Marbles.'38 The return
by the Heidelberg Museum of Antiquities in Germany indicates that museums
do consider object preservation when deciding to return antiquities. Thus, it is
not insignificant that the likely resting place of the Krater upon its return to Italy
will be in the Villa Giulia National Etruscan Museum 139 where it will be
preserved safely from environmental forces and, with the help of the Carabinieri,
protected from theft. Had there not been a secure site, it is unlikely the Met
would have relinquished the Krater only to see it stolen or destroyed."4
4. The Bilateral Agreement
The existence of the Italy MOU was integral to reaching an agreement.
Although Italy could not have petitioned the US directly under the agreement
for the return of the Krater, 4 ' it nevertheless facilitated the Krater's return in
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For example, Italy created a special unit, the TPC, within the Carabinieri trained exclusively in the
protection of Italy's cultural property.
See John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Egin Marbles, 83 Mich L Rev 1881, 1917 (1985)
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(showing that the Elgin Marbles were better preserved in the British Museum than out in the
open air in Greece).
See Martin Bailey, ParthenonFragment Returned to Greece, Art Newspaper 9 (Feb 2006).
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Povoledo, Italy and U.S. Sign AntiquitiesAccord at 2 (cited in note 1).
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Though it is unclear whether judges would consider ability to protect the object as a factor in
deciding restitution claims, much of the action occurs outside the judicial arena-the model is
itself concerned with private settlements of these claims. Outside the judicial context, public
pressure can play a significant role in influencing the actions of museum and government officials
and it would be easy for a museum to stave off public pressure by pointing out the deficiencies in
the source nation's ability to protect the object.
The Krater was imported by the Met in 1972, while the Italy MOU did not go into effect until
2001 and is not retroactive.
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two key respects. For one thing, it augmented Italy's negotiating position by
raising public awareness of the looting problem both in Italy and in the US. The
renewal of the agreement in January 2006, during the middle of the Italy-Met
negotiations and just one month before the Accord, meant that the museum
could not easily have dismissed Italy's claims while hoping they would go
unnoticed by the public and authorities.
More importantly, the Italy MOU pressured Italy to change its loan policy,
which inadvertently made possible key provisions of the Accord. Loans of
objects for display purposes were limited to one year, and longer terms were
permitted on a case-by-case basis only with the inclusion of significant research
or education components. 142 In May 2004, however, an Italian law extended the
loan limit to four years, 143 thus allowing Italy to implement its loans-forantiquities program effectively." Without the extension, long-term loans would
have to be approved on a case-by-case basis. In the past, the bureaucracy of
applying for and receiving the necessary export certificates would often render
obtaining a loan impossible. 145 The long-term loans for display were crucial in
getting the Met to transfer ownership. If source nations make the granting of
temporary loans difficult, either as an administrative or as a legal matter,146 their
ability to negotiate for restitution is grossly undercut because the assured future
source of loans would be, as a practical matter, meaningless. The Model may
then be limited by the loan policies of source nations. 47
5. The Evidentiary Circumstances
The evidence acquired against the Met allowed Italy to reach an agreement
that would otherwise not have been made. While it is true that negotiations are
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See US Department of State, Guidelines: Loans of Archaeological Material Under the 2001 U.S.-Itayl
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Memorandum of Understanding(cited in note 87).
Eakin, Itay UsingArt at 3 (cited in note 130).
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The loans- for-antiquities program refers to the policy of Italy offering loans of works of
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equivalent significance in exchange for the return and transfer of ownership of the antiquity. See
Italy MOU at art 2 (cited in note 85).
Eakin, Italy UsingArt at 2 (cited in note 130).
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For example, the laws could limit the loan duration, the types of objects eligible, or the purpose
for the loan such as requiring a research component. Any qualification of the loan lessens its
potential value to the museum, even the last example because often a museum may wish to
borrow a piece for exhibition, and thus display purposes only, and may not wish to undertake
special research or educational components (whatever may be required by the law) or may not
have the resources to undertake such projects.
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It is possible that source nations' loan policies are
a bilateral agreement correlates with more liberal
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favors source nations with more favorable foreign
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heavily influenced by the evidence amassed on both sides such that source
nations will have evidence to negotiate, Italy's situation was unique because of
the Medici investigations. While investigating into the Krater's provenance, Italy
launched investigations against antiquities dealer Giacomo Medici concerning a
separate matter that resulted in a 1995 raid on a Swiss warehouse yielding
photographs and documentation linking Medici to dealer Robert Hecht and the
Met. 148 This ultimately led to a 2001 raid on Hecht's apartment in Paris that
uncovered a journal with passages describing the illegal excavation and export of
49
the Krater as well as dealings with the Met.1
This fortunate turn of events facilitated the Accord in two ways. Directly,
the evidence (acquired from a separate investigation) connected the Met to the
dealers in a manner revealing knowledge by Met officials of the Krater's illicit
past and making it more likely Italy would be able to meet its burden of proof in
a US court. Thus, Italy had a greater chance of winning in court and more
leverage in negotiations since the Met was even more anxious to avoid
litigation. 5 0 Indirectly, the Medici investigation allowed Italy to criminally
prosecute Hecht and True in the years just prior to the Accord. These criminal
prosecutions put enormous pressure on other museum officials because before
True no American curator stood trial on criminal charges for looting in another
country. Not only was there pressure to avoid litigation in American courts, but
Met directors Montebello and Hoving and their curators faced criminal
prosecution in Italy, which amplified the desirability of a quick and easy
resolution to the dispute. In this spirit, a major tenet of the Accord absolved the
5
Met of all civil and criminalliability.1
1 Not all source countries will be so fortunate
as to stumble upon documentation and photographs from a separate
investigation proving knowledge of illegal excavation and implicating the cr~me
152
de la cr~me of the international art market in criminal conspiracies.
B. IS THE MODEL SIGNIFICANT?
The particularity of the Italy-Met situation is evidenced by the discussion
of the preceding five factors, all of which were arguably necessary for the Model
148

See Horowitz, How Hot Vase It at 4-5 (cited in note 101).

149

150

See Slayman, The Trialin Rome at 4 (cited in note 29).
See Stevenson Swanson, U.S. Museum Curators Wonder: Who's Next?, Chi Trib C9 (Mar 19, 2006).
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Accord, art 8.3 (cited in note 112).
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See Jason Felch and Ralph Frammolino, Italian Authoriies Allege Theft of Aniquiies: Polaroids Used
As Evidence, Cincinnati Post A9 (Nov 10, 2005) (illustrating the extensive implications from the
evidence found at the Medici warehouse revealing looted objects at the Boston Museum of Fine
Arts, Minneapolis Institute of Arts, Toledo Museum of Art, Princeton University Art Museum, J.
Paul Getty Museum, and the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art).
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to be successful. At the same time, these factors show the unlikelihood of the
Model being exactly replicated to produce a similar accord. Yet, this does not
render the Model meaningless as it is capable of effectuating change on several
levels.
1. Public Perception
The Model is likely to raise public awareness of the illegal trade in cultural
property. Awareness of cultural property issues among the general public and
even among the percentage of the population that visit museums is low.15 3 Until
Italy began to implement its aggressive campaign to recover cultural property,
there was not much public debate outside academic circles. However, since Italy
and the Met began negotiations over the high-profile Krater, the number of
New York Times articles concerning looted antiquities has increased
dramatically) 4 In addition, the group Saving Antiquities for Everyone has been
arranging private tours of the Met to see the Krater and also of the Boston
Museum of Fine Arts in order to increase public awareness of illicit
provenances.' 55
Between the Italian criminal trials of high-profile members of the art
world, the alleged scandals at the Getty and the Met (two of America's most
famous art museums), and the unprecedented return of the Krater, the public
has been inundated with newspaper articles focused on the cultural property
debate. The increased attention given by the press can only serve to aid the
plight of source nations by helping hold museums accountable. As the public
156
begins to question how the artifacts on display came to be in the museum,
museum officials will be forced to answer tough questions on provenance and
acquisition policies, thus making the acquisition process more transparent, and
pressuring museums to tighten their policies." 7
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See Maria Puente, Stolen Art Met With Public Yawn, USA Today 1D (Mar 29, 2006).
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A search of the New York Times archives online shows that the number of stories having to do
with "looted antiquities" in 2000 was 7; 2001 was 3, 2002 was 6; 2003 was 42; and 2004 was 10.
Note that for 2003, 37 of the 42 articles dealt with the extraordinary circumstances of the looting
of the museums in Iraq, so after accounting for this, the number was 5, similar to the preceding
years. For 2005 (when talks began between Italy and the Met), the numbers jump to 37 and for
the first three and a half months of 2006 (through April 16, 2006), they are 27. See
<http://www.nyimes.com> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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See Saving Antiquities for Everyone, SAFE Tours, available online at
<http://www.savingantiquities.org/whatwedosafetours.php> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
See Puente, Stolen Art Met (cited in note 153) (discussing how people are beginning to question at
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the Met).
157 See John O'Hagan and Clare McAndrew, Restricting International Trade in the National Artistic
Patimonj:Economic Rationale andPoligy Instruments, 10 IntlJ Cultural Prop 32, 48 (2001).
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2. Museum Policies
Museums will also feel pressure from the Accord to change their
acquisition and loan policies. The AAMD,'5 8 of which the Met is a member,
published guidelines in 2004 for acquiring works of ancient art and
archaeological materials.' 59 They stipulate that museums may not acquire an
object before thoroughly researching its provenance, 160 or any works known to
have been stolen from a public institution or an official archaeological
excavation, and should not acquire works removed after November 1970 (in
compliance with the UNESCO Convention). 161 The AAMD guidelines include
an exception for works of incomplete provenance so long as the public is best
served by the acquisition, it would secure its "conservation, exhibition, study,
and interpretation," and the work has been outside the probable country of
origin long enough not to provide a "material incentive" to looting. 62 This
exception allowing museum officials to use "professional judgment" for difficult
cases makes it easy for museums to acquire what they wish' 163and justify it as
"providing a singular and material contribution to knowledge.'
The Accord's potential to effectuate change is in narrowing this exception
by raising the requisite level of public value necessary to display unprovenanced
objects. Even if other nations may not be able to perfectly replicate the model,
there will likely be an increase in the frequency and intensity of calls for
restitution, and museum officials will then be forced to answer questions
concerning the provenance of their collections. Curators and directors faced
with acquisition decisions will likely be more thorough in their provenance
research and take seriously the parameters of acquiring unprovenanced pieces
such that only with strong public interest justifications will they proceed with the
acquisition. The potential future costs of acquiring the piece are increased as the
likelihood of provenance questions, restitution claims, and public awareness is
greater, so more precautions will be taken prior to acquisition. These changes

158

159

160

The Association of Art Museum Dealers is an association of 172 members comprised of directors
of American and Canadian art museums that seeks to establish standards for the professional
practices of museums and directors. See Association of Art Museum Directors, About AAMD,
available online at <http://aamd.org/about/> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Association of Art Museum Directors. Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Acquisiion of
Archaeological Materials and Andent Art (2004), available online at <http://www.mta-hq.org/
pdf/Assem06.AAMDHdt.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
Id § II(A)(1). Provenance research may include ownership history, claims of ownership,
appearance in databases of stolen works, and circumstances of its offer to the museum. Id.
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Id

III(C)-(D).
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Id § II(E).
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Id.
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will result in museums adopting policies more identical to those promulgated
by
6 and recommended by source nations and archaeologists. 16 1
ICOM6'
Changes in museum policies and perceptions are already apparent. Since
the Accord, the AAMD has shown an increased concern for acquiring works
without provenance. A study done by the AAMD demonstrated that only 53 of
the association's 169 members actively collect antiquities, and out of the
antiquities purchases for the 5 years preceding the study, 98 percent have
complete post-1970 provenance 61 While some view this as merely an effort to
shift the blame away from American museums, it could signal the beginning of a
trend of researched looks into museum acquisitions. 6 As one example, after the
Accord, the Art Institute of Chicago reviewed its collection to ensure the
integrity of its pieces. 68
Furthermore, the Accord has already spawned changes in museum policies
regarding loans. Most museums do not acquire pieces outright but rather simply
display objects on loan from private collectors and other museums. 169 After the
Accord was signed, in February 2006 the AAMD implemented new guidelines
for displaying loaned objects7 ° that parallel the 2004 museum acquisition
guidelines.17 ' Although criticized by the archaeology community for not
requiring temporary displays to comply with the laws of the country of origin
and allowing displays of antiquities without complete provenance in certain
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For the standards promulgated by ICOM, see ICOM Code of EthicsforMuseums: 2004 Edition, (cited
in note 12). The ICOM acquisition policy allows for only a very limited exception for
unprovenanced pieces and gives more guidance to their acquisition as opposed to just saying
museum officials should use their "professional judgment." Id at arts 2.9, 3.4.
165 See AIA, Archaeologists Call for Responsible Museum Acquisition Policies, available online at
<http://www.archaeological.org/webinfo.php?page = 10344> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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The AAMD confirmed this in its study, which showed that members of the AAMD spent just
seven million dollars annually on acquiring antiquities in the five years prior to the study, which is
less than 10 percent of the global trade estimated at one hundred million dollars. Association of
Art Museum Directors, Survey Shows Museum (cited in note 166).
170 Association of Art Museum Directors, Report of the AAMD Subcommittee on Incoming Loans of
ArcbaeologicalMaterialand Andent Art at 3-8 (cited in note 3).
171 The 2006 loan guidelines emphasize compliance with US law, id § 1I(A), and the UNESCO
Convention, id § 11(B), research into the object's provenance, id § 11(C), and contain an exception
for showing unprovenanced works if "public exhibition makes possible important advances in
scholarship and/or facilitates the emergence of new information," id § II(D).
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situations,'72 the guidelines represent a substantial step forward in museum
policies. The promulgation of equivalent standards for acquisition and loans
shows that museums are taking responsibility for all objects within their walls
and recognizing that the display of both loaned and acquired objects of
unknown provenance, fuels the demand for looted antiquities.
3. Source Nations
While the Model may not be perfectly replicable, it is likely to inspire
source nations to more aggressively pursue their cultural property claims in
several respects. First, in order to be in position to make demands to museums
like Italy, other nations could be inspired to increase domestic protections of
their own cultural property,'73 pursue negotiations with the US to achieve
bilateral agreements,'74 and bolster the investigative capabilities of the police or
establish relationships with Interpol and the Carabinieri 75 Second, they could
adopt policies similar to Italy of refusing to loan art and antiquities to museums
that continue to acquire works without provenance, or that have pieces known
to be illegally exported. Third, source nations could begin to pressure museums
by publicizing their looting problems and by initiating the demand process with
every museum suspected of harboring a work illegally exported from their
country. All of these steps could help source nations reach their own
particularized settlements with museums. The Model could thus act as a catalyst
by showing other nations that it is possible to achieve successful resolution of
cultural property disputes outside of litigation through cooperation with
museums.
V. CONCLUSION
The Accord is a model of international collaboration that will be
instrumental in shaping the future of the cultural property debate. Although not
perfectly replicable, it is unprecedented and reveals the possibility of an
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See AIA, ALA Statement on Museum Acquisiions andLoans ofAnliquiies andAncient Art Works (Mar
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2006), available online at <http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/archaeologywatch/
museumpolicy/AIAAAMDResponse.pdf> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
This could include both increasing the resources and training of the police to more effectively
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enforce cultural property laws as well as making structural improvements, such as building
museums capable of preserving and exhibiting the antiquities, and securing existing museums to
prevent theft.
A bilateral agreement would facilitate the return of yet-to-be-looted objects and raise public
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awareness.
This last possibility is especially important for source nations considering how crucial evidence of
illegal excavation and export is to achieving superior bargaining positions vis-A-vis museums and
thus restitution.
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alternative to litigation in US courts.7 6 A dialogue between source nations and
museums has been started 77 which could usher in a new way of thinking.
Instead of focusing on possession and who owns the art, museums could be
regarded as stewards of cultural property which protect and preserve it unless
circumstances call for its restitution.' Whether this transformation is successful
depends upon the ability of source nations to successfully negotiate amicable
resolutions with museums. Given the likely rush of museums to cooperate with
source nations lest they be cut off from future loans in the wake of the Accord,
it is possible that there still may be universal museums, but as stewards of world
heritage, not its owners.
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For a brief discussion on cooperative solutions, see Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposalfor Protecting the

"Cultural"and 'Propery"Apectsof CulturalProperyunder InternationalLaw, 16 Fordham Ind L J 1033,
1070 (1993).
177 See Deborah K. Dietsch, Big Fight about Illict Art; Met, Ita, Pact Returns Works, Wash Times B01
178

(Mar 4, 2006).
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